Fortune does not come twice. Misfortune does not come alone.
- Ancient Chinese Proverb
The coming war with China will likely not begin with some overt act requiring an instant and reciprocal response by the United States. China will not suddenly invade Taiwan. North Korea will not launch an unexpected first-strike against the South. A war with China must progress incrementally; a direct confrontation with the United States is the last thing that Chinese leadership wants now. The People’s Republic is still ten years away from matching U.S. weapons technology and the engine driving their train is international trade. A war now would create a strategic nightmare for China, cutting off access to vital markets and bring their economic machine to a grinding halt.
Our political and military leaders understand this. They also understand that China employs agents embedded in every major industry and institution of higher learning in this country. There is no method available in peacetime to prevent the leaks; even the International Trade in Arms Restrictions law, overseen by the State Department, can’t cover every contingency. Foreign nationals have access to restricted documents as part of their jobs, in spite of the prohibition. Agents embedded or recruited by the People’s Republic hold jobs at all levels. They are a key to the sudden technological leaps we’ve seen from China over the past decade and they are too valuable to lose now.
It will be difficult, but not impossible, to coax the Chinese into an imprudent move. Similar to the manner in which the U.S. cornered Japan during the 1930’s, it’s probable we have already written a playbook for this process. It begins on the diplomatic front, by threatening Chinese allies and trading partners and befriending China’s enemies. That Iran is currently in our sights (through the very public demands and threats coming out of Israel) should be looked at in the overall context. China and Russia have provided Iran both guardianship in the UN Security Council and technical assistance in their ongoing nuclear enrichment program. As opposed to Iraq, the Iranian threat is legitimate – over the past two decades the Russians and Chinese have contributed greatly to Iran’s progress, not only in expanding its nuclear capability, but also in developing missile delivery systems designed specifically for nuclear carriage. Whether the Mullahs can hit where they aim is beside the point. The situation creates diplomatic opportunities for the United States, bridges to either cross or burn as events warrant.
The Chinese and Russians will appear steadfast in their resolve to prevent action against Iran, at least initially. The interesting element in any Russo-Sino partnership is the overwhelming degree of mistrust hovering over those clasped hands. China is the more mistrustful, ever the junior partner from the days when Uncle Joe Stalin called the shots for world-wide Communism; often against the perceived interests of the Maoists. This natural suspicion works to the U.S. advantage in any matter that places the Russians at cross-purposes with China. Opportunities abound in such a circumstance, and such circumstances are relatively easy to create out of thin air.
The sudden disenfranchisement of Pakistan by the U.S. is also contextual, not so much for Pakistan as for its historical enemy India. U.S-India relations have suffered through the War on Terror period from which we are finally emerging. Pakistan, rather than being the bulwark against terrorism as once perceived, is now treated as an enabler to terrorist organizations. A marriage of convenience with India becomes a real possibility as the U.S. pulls away from Pakistan and offers access to a massive, mobilized army, navy and air force. “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is a constant impeller for wartime alliances. That the Indian and Chinese armies take shots at one another along the disputed Tibetan border regularly is one more card to be played at the proper moment. It’s certain that India happily enters into partnership with the U.S. if it appears to work against both Pakistani and Chinese interests.
Meanwhile, The East Asian rim continues its arms buildup. Even pacifist Japan is in the process of upgrading its air force, with the tacit approval of the United States. The recent sale to the Taiwanese of $6 Billion worth of Blackhawk helicopters and Patriot missile launchers to augment Taiwan’s defenses is yet another threat against Chinese hegemony in the region and a grating insult to the People’s Republic.
Collectively, Russia and India in the west, along with Taiwan and a rearmed Japan to the east (each of which counts China as a historical enemy) amount to major set of fixed, ongoing threats to go along with the mobile threat presented by the U.S. Navy. Under such conditions, any mildly threatening demonstration by the Chinese military (for which they are notorious) pulls the trigger for an immediate armed response in force by the offended ally, and then followed up for good measure by a U.S.-led coalition “intervention.”
As this was never intended as a war of conquest, nuclear options shouldn’t come into play from such a confrontation. Borders need not be breeched to any great degree. A seaward blockade alone will inflict major economic damage. The goal is to neutralize and isolate the modern China and force them to sue for peace. Surrounded by enemies and cut off from the rest of the world, the Chinese people will first consider their present, advantageous economic position, and then their greater history - of the millennia during which they existed unmolested and without a great ambition to dominate others. They will understand, better than anyone, the need for a balanced solution. We cover the terms that bring such peace (and continued prosperity) to China and everyone else in Part 4.




