In Praise of Bud Selig's Playoff Scheme

Since his elevation to Commissioner of Major League Baseball as reward (or punishment) for inciting a coup d’état among his fellow franchise owners against then-Commissioner Fay Vincent in 1992, Allan Huber “Bud” Selig has left his mark on the business side of American professional baseball. Negotiating massive increases in television revenue for the leagues, expanding the sharing of profits among franchises and an introduction of a soft salary cap and associated “luxury tax” are all to the good, providing some level of benefit to owners, players and fans.

On the dark side, we have the Steroid Era, a stain as historically permanent as that left by those gambling interests who poisoned the public image of major league baseball throughout the period of the dead ball. We also have the recent conquest of the Caribbean islands, where mercenaries play missionary, creating shining baseball factories and inducing impoverished local boys to sign away their human rights to the Great White God of Major League Dreams. Finally, the abolition of separate League offices removed a level of oversight which may have prevented, to some degree, the above noted offenses, among others.

Bud Selig insists that he will soon retire from his post, but before he goes he wants to fix one more thing – the current playoff system – by adding one additional qualifying team and series per league. The idea has generated a great deal of negative feedback from sports journalists and fans, but both history and pragmatism favor such a move. When the American and National Leagues expanded to three divisions each in 1994, the introduction of the Wild Card entry was necessary to even out the playoff run to the World Series. Under this system, in each league, the three division champions, along with the team with the best winning percentage that failed to finish first during the regular season, compete on an essentially equal footing. This constituted an escalation from the original playoff system introduced in 1969, when the leagues each expanded to twelve teams and split into two six-team divisions.

In 1994, as in 1969, the number of potentially meaningful regular season games (those having a direct impact on individual races) increased by a factor of four, at a minimum. This is important in terms of the potential impact on attendance, even more important to television ratings, which translate into the advertising revenue that dictates the value of baseball to broadcasters. The concept worked in generating greater interest for playoff baseball, but had a somewhat negative effect on late season play. In the current setup, there is no appreciable competitive difference between winning a division and qualifying as a wild card. All teams enter the playoffs without any structural advantage, each team required to win the same number of games in order to move on to the World Series.

Selig noticed the logistical problem, as did many of us. Once a team is assured of a wild card by virtue of their overall winning percentage, there is no practical reason, other than team pride and a small monetary award, to continue contending for the division lead. There are numerous examples through the years of teams in such positions playing out the final week or so of the season without any sense of urgency, having already qualified for the playoffs. This situation effectively neutralizes the drama of certain divisional races where two teams have a definite mathematical chance, but no objective purpose, for finishing on top, resulting in reduced fan interest and decreased value for that part of the schedule.

There’s another problem with the current system. Teams that finish first in weaker divisions often have lower winning percentages than teams in strong divisions that fail to qualify for the playoffs. Since the year 2000, there have been seven separate instances of one or more teams falling short in the wild card race, while having better winning percentages than a division winner in their respective leagues:

2000 NY Yankees AL East 1^st Place .540 pct. In Playoffs

2000 Cleveland Indians AL Central 2^nd Place .554 pct. Did Not Qualify

2001 Atlanta Braves NL East 1^st Place .543 pct. In Playoffs

2001 San Francisco Giants NL West 2^nd Place .556 pct. Did Not Qualify

2003 Minnesota Twins AL Central 1^st Place .556 pct. In Playoffs

2003 Seattle Mariners AL West 2^nd Place .574 pct. Did Not Qualify

2005 San Diego Padres NL West 1^st Place .506 pct. In Playoffs

2005 Philadelphia Phillies NL East 2^nd Place .543 pct. Did Not Qualify

2005 Florida Marlins NL East 3^rd Place .512 pct. Did Not Qualify

2005 New York Mets NL East 4^th Place .512 pct. Did Not Qualify

2006 St. Louis Cardinals NL Central 1^st Place .516 pct. In Playoffs

2006 Philadelphia Phillies NL East 2^nd Place .525 pct. Did Not Qualify

2007 Chicago Cubs NL Central 1^st Place .525 pct. In Playoffs

2007 San Diego Padres NL West 2^nd Place .546 pct. Did Not Qualify

2008 Los Angeles Dodgers NL West 1^st Place .519 pct. In Playoffs

2008 New York Mets NL East 2^nd Place .549 pct. Did Not Qualify

2008 Houston Astros NL Central 3^rd Place .534 pct. Did Not Qualify

2008 St. Louis Cardinals NL Central 4^th Place .531 pct. Did Not Qualify

2008 Florida Marlins NL East 3^rd Place .522 pct. Did Not Qualify

The idea of adding a Wild Card round, in which two qualifying teams play for the right to move on, while division race winners are awarded a bye, satisfies two inequities at once. A second wild card slot means that good teams are less likely to be penalized with exclusion for the simple vagaries of divisional placement. The increased importance of finishing in first place means that teams will feel compelled to make every effort to win their regular season title outright, rather than face the prospect of playing an additional round of games. In this issue, I fully support the commissioner and believe that every fair-minded baseball aficionado, in viewing the facts, will come to the same conclusion.